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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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January 19, 1982

Senior Interdepartmental Group No. 4

TO: OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz
DOD - COL John Stanford
CIA -
ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey

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SUBJECT: SIG Meeting - INF

Under Secretary Stoessel will chair a meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group on INF on Thursday, January 21, at 2:00 p.m. in room 7219 at the Department of State. The purpose of the meeting is to resolve the remaining outstanding issue in the draft treaty text on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. A discussion paper for the meeting is attached. The rationale for Option C will be provided under separate cover.

Please telephone the name of your agency's representative to Sheila Lopez, 632-5804.

*done
JSC*

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

INF Discussion Paper

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SIG Briefing Paper on Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations

The US and the Soviet Union resumed the first round of negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) on January 12 in Geneva. During this session, planned to last into March, we intend to table a draft treaty text based on the President's proposal of November 18 for the complete elimination of Soviet SS-20s, 4s and 5s, and the cancellation of US Pershing II and GLCM deployment.

Basic Objectives

The basic objectives of tabling a draft treaty text are:

- To provide a substantive basis for keeping the discussion focused on the US proposal.
- To keep the Soviet negotiators on the defensive by putting forward a proposal that is more detailed and more serious than that of the Soviets.
- To demonstrate to the Allies that the United States is committed to pursuing meaningful arms control agreements which enhance security.

ISSUE: Should the draft treaty explicitly ban all long-range land based missiles, including conventional cruise missiles?

Summary

All agencies agree that land-based conventionally armed missiles below 1800km should not be banned. There is not yet agreement on how to handle such missiles above 1800km.

The principal objective of the INF Treaty is to ban ground-launched nuclear missiles in the designated range category, i.e., 1800km - 5500 km. At issue is whether or not to ban conventionally armed missiles of comparable ranges.

ACDA believes it is necessary to include such an explicit ban on conventional missiles in the treaty now, with respect to the 1800-5500km range band which is the central focus of the treaty, in order to verify the treaty and to forestall circumvention.

State believes we should postpone a decision on how to deal with non-nuclear armed missiles until the INF negotiations have further progressed, our own military requirements have further evolved, and our treatment of conventional cruise missiles in INF can be assessed alongside our treatment of conventional cruise missiles in START. State does not think it advisable to divert the negotiations at this early stage to a discussion of the complexities associated with verification of whether or not a missile is "nuclear-armed".

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State would confine language in the draft treaty text to "nuclear missiles" without specifying whether the phrase meant "nuclear-armed" or "nuclear-capable". If queried by the Soviet Union concerning the effect of the proposed treaty on conventionally-armed cruise missiles, the US would indicate that the issue of verification would require further discussion between the sides, and that the US would be formulating and presenting proposals on the subject subsequently.

OSD and JCS believe that we should not now take action that would preclude the deployment of non-nuclear armed missiles, either in the INF negotiations or in a manner that would establish a precedent for the START negotiations which are now in an early planning stage. These agencies would thus confine the draft treaty limitations to "nuclear-armed missiles", deferring until a later stage the issue of whether extending the treaty limitations to non-nuclear-armed missiles is in our interest.

Option A: ACDA believes that the treaty should ban all missiles with ranges between 1800km and 5500 km.

Option B: State believes that the treaty should ban "nuclear missiles" with ranges between 1800km and 5500km, postponing the issue of how conventionally armed missiles of comparable range will be handled.

Option C: OSD and JCS believe that the treaty should ban "nuclear-armed missiles" with ranges between 1800km and 5500km, postponing the issue of whether extending the treaty limitations to non-nuclear armed missiles is in our interest.

Discussion:

Rationale for Option A

There is no known way, even with intrusive measures, to verify that long-range Soviet missiles are not in fact nuclear-armed. Moreover, if conventional missiles are exempted, it would be perfectly legal for the Soviets to deploy long-range conventional missiles in unlimited numbers, and also to build nuclear warheads for them, so long as the nuclear warheads were never tested or deployed on the missiles. The Soviets could acquire a rapid breakout potential without having to cheat.

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Including conventionally-armed missiles in the ban of INF missiles over 1800km (i.e. all missiles over 1800km) would enhance verification of the key provision of the agreement -- the ban on missiles in the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 range class. Verification of the 925 - 1800km limits would be more difficult, but these are intended to be collateral constraints to prevent Soviet circumvention of the main provision.

The US has no program for pursuing conventional cruise missiles with ranges over 1,800km, and even if a requirement were established, land-basing is probably the least attractive of the alternative modes.

In addition, it would not be in the US interest to permit unconstrained deployment of Soviet long-range chemical-armed missiles, which present a particularly serious threat to NATO airfields.

For all of these reasons, the benefits of a higher confidence ban on long-range conventionally-armed missiles outweigh the benefits of a US option to deploy such missiles - i.e., banning all missiles between 1800 - 5500km.

Rationale for Option B

Although no military requirement has been established at present for long-range (i.e. over 1800km.) land-based conventional cruise missiles, there is clear technical potential for producing such systems, and a requirement may be identified over the indefinite period of the treaty. On the other hand, the tabling at this point of a proposed treaty which explicitly left conventional missiles unconstrained could lead the Soviets to publicly question the seriousness of our commitment to achieving an arms control agreement, and could cause our Allies and Western publics to harbor similar doubts.

To propose limits on long-range conventionally armed missiles in an INF treaty could have a precedential impact on START negotiations. It could be difficult to argue that measures required for verification of arming in one agreement are not necessary in the next -- i.e., we could be led to apply the same verification procedures to ALCMs and SLCMs in START as to GLCMs in INF.

While verification of a nuclear missile ban would be facilitated by a ban on all missiles, there are many other difficulties for verification of an INF treaty which also must be addressed. The US is still formulating verification proposals for inclusion in the treaty at a later date, and it is not necessary or even desirable to deal with verification difficulties concerning conventionally armed missiles at this point.

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The treaty should keep the negotiations focused on the objective of banning the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5, while acknowledging that verification and non-circumvention issues may require additional constraints.

For the above reasons, State believes we should table an agreement focused upon nuclear missiles, but at the same time explicitly acknowledge that the question of possible limits needed on conventional missiles to permit verification and forestall circumvention, is an issue on which the US will need to make further decisions, and the US and USSR will need to discuss as negotiations proceed.

Rationale for Option C:
(To be provided.)

Decision

Option A: Ban all armed missiles with ranges between 1800km and 5500km.

Option B: Ban all nuclear missiles with ranges between 1800km and 5500km, postponing the issue of how conventionally armed missiles of comparable range will be handled.

Option C: Ban all nuclear-armed missiles with ranges between 1800km and 5500km, postponing the issue of how conventionally armed missiles of comparable range will be handled.

Decide for Option A _____ Option B _____ Option C _____

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